Introduction
Globalization-often defined as the increasing interconnectedness of the different parts of the world, involving reductions of barriers to exchange and the movement of ideas, goods, people, money, and so forth-is presented by advocates as a win-win process for all involved (Bhagwati 2007) . However, it has attracted criticism, with opponents pointing to its failure to deliver to much of the world's population the prosperity it promised (Selwyn 2017) .
Beginning in 2008, the North Atlantic financial crisis helped galvanize opposition to globalization in many Western countries, giving rise, for africaToDAy 66 (1) example, to the Occupy Movement, which began in the United States in 2011. Politicians in some countries seized on a general discontent with neoliberal globalization, turning these sentiments into electoral victories, with a promise to reconfigure the process. A variety of contributory factors were in play, but Britain's vote to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the election of Donald Trump in the United States are examples of this. These developments have effects and implications for global development and international relations. In particular, the Trump administration follows a so-called America First foreign policy, disengaging from some global commitments, including to Africa, where, as Trump has tweeted, "Every penny of the $7 billion going to Africa as per Obama will be stolen" (@realDonaldTrump July 1, 2013). He has reportedly spoken of Africa as "shithole countries" (Mindlock 2018) . 1 This article interrogates the Trump administration's African agenda with a focus on US-Africa trade relations, development aid, foreign direct investments (FDI), security and terrorism concerns, and climate change. Additionally, we explore whether US competitors, such as China and the United Kingdom, will look to strengthen their relationships in Africa, given relative US disengagement. The Trump presidency is highly unusual in many regards, but in engagement with African states, its agenda is partly a reversion to the pre-Clinton policy of neglect and disengagement when perceived US interests are not at stake (Adibe 2013; Omotosho 2013) , combined with coercive governmentality 2 when they are-which we characterize as malignancy combined with neglect, or malign neglect. Henry Shue (1980) has written about the so-called holocaust of neglect in the Global South by the United States, which continues under Trump; however America First, while attempting to reassert the US's leading role in the world, is paradoxically a retreat from global hegemony, which cannot be based on economic and military force alone (Agnew 2017) .
The next section explores Trump's attempt to appropriate and redefine the alter-globalization agenda. This is followed by the discussion of the history of previous US-Africa relations and the implications of the Trump administration's policy for development on the continent. We then explore this by sectors and examine whether and how US competitors might fill the gap. The final section provides a summary and a conclusion.
Trump and the Redefinition of Alter-Globalization
To conceptualize the Trump administration's foreign policy, it is important to distinguish between anti-globalization and alter-globalization: the former seeks to reverse globalizing trends, through reversion to greater national sovereignty and more local or national economic reliance; the latter, best described as counterhegemonic, seeks to replace the dominant global regime "with one that maximizes democratic political control and makes the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship its priorities" (Evans 2008, 272) . Thus, alter-globalizationists do not oppose the process per se, but oppose one particular type, neoliberal economic africaToDAy 66 (1) globalization, and not others, such as, for some of them, the global spread of human rights (Ritzer and Dean 2015, 431) .
As Joseph Stiglitz (2016) argues, much of the early opposition to globalization took the form of alter-globalization and came from developing countries. Since the 2008 global economic crisis, dissent has spread to a large share of the populations in Europe and the United States, but this mainstreaming of alter-globalization has taken a nationalist, populist, and reactionary character. Politicians in many of these countries have seized on the general discontent with globalization to win electoral victories. One could point to rising economic nationalism in the Western world (e.g., US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the trade war with China) and the questioning of benefits of political integration (e.g., the Brexit vote in the UK) and the backlash against immigration and the desire to build walls as examples of such efforts. While many initially argued that Trump was anti-neoliberal (Fraser 2017 ) by virtue of his promises to increase tariff protection of American industry and clamp down on corporate offshoring, the reality might be better characterized as promotion of "neoliberalism in one country" (Carmody 2017) . Some have noted the irony that President Trump, allegedly a multibillionaire, claims to represent the working class (Roy 2017) . In many ways, therefore, the US position under the Trump administration is not antiglobalization but a particular form of alter-globalization, driven by the desire to rewrite the rules of the game by restricting trade when it directly hurts the United States, clamping down on immigration, and reducing its commitment to the global order. In a way, Trump is trying to create a new class compromise in the United States and a new spatial fix globally (Harvey 1982) to US relative economic decline based on a retraction of overseas commitments and continued overseas market opening. Trump seeks to insulate the country from the impacts of the free market through economic protectionism and to "keep the world outside out" through heightened immigration restriction, yet at the same time, he continues to promote external economic liberalization to open up markets around the world for American exports-a strategy reminiscent of China's (Lim 2010) .
There has been substantial and ongoing media coverage of the implications of these events for the United States and Europe, but far less has been written about the impacts on the developing world and on Africa in particular. How has Trump's ascension to power affected US-Africa relations and development on the continent? We here engage these issues in the context of Africa to identify the main trends and effects.
US-Africa Relations and Impacts of the Trump Administration
Delinking as a concept is often associated with dependency theory (Amin and Wolfers 1990) , but arguably the Trump administration is pursuing a policy of selective delinking in its international relations, reflective of the dialectics of globalization. Trumpism represents a partial and reactionary africaToDAy 66(1) countermovement to marketization (Polanyi 1944) . This selective delinking has taken a variety of channels, including trade, investment (attempting to get American corporations to reshore production operations), and aid. For instance, the administration's tariffs on steel and aluminum products from abroad can be seen as a selective delinking from international trade norms and rules. This intent in relation to Africa is significant and was signaled early on.
Before the recent recognition of Africa's role in the global realignment in politics, trade, and international cooperation (Carmody 2016) , the continent did not feature much in global politics, and the US foreign-policy view of the continent was focused on benign neglect, at best (Adibe 2014; Omotosho 2013) . With a few exceptions, the United States showed a general lack of interest in the continent in most of the pre-World War II era (Waters 2009 ). When the US did engage with Africa after World War II, its policy involved engaging or disengaging with individual African countries, based on its national interest, mostly defined in terms of counteracting the Soviet Union's attempt to gain influence in the region (Keller 2006) . US interest in Africa declined further with the coming to power of President Ronald Reagan (1981-89) , except where perceived US interests were threatened, as in southern Africa in particular (Adibe 2014; Shubin 2008) . George H. W. Bush's administration (1989-93) continued a benign neglect approach, with Waters arguing, "Africa was very much an afterthought for his administration" (2009, lxvi) .
The US-Africa relationship began to see serious and sustained engagement with the Clinton administration and it subsequently deepened, with significant bipartisan support. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations saw a remarkable continuity in both the Congress and the White House on the US agenda in Africa. Each of these presidents launched a major flagship program for the continent-including Clinton's trade-focused African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Bush's health-focused President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and Obama's infrastructurefocused Power Africa, which is now under threat from budget cuts (Mama 2017). In addition, George W. Bush tried to restructure US foreign aid by creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCA), which supported African governments that showed specific commitments to improvements in governance, democracy, and human rights (Owusu 2007) , though, in practice, US geostrategic allies have been the ones most supported, and the MCA was heavily neoliberal in orientation (Soederberg 2004) . The election of Donald Trump signaled a radical break with this consensus, with important implications for both US-Africa relations and development on the continent.
Given the deepening pre-Trump US-Africa relationship, many were surprised when the new president's transition team indicated possible disengagement from the continent when it sent a set of probing questions to the State Department, including: "With so much corruption in Africa, how much of our funding is stolen?" "We've been fighting al-Shabaab for a decade; why haven't we won?" "How does U.S. business compete with other africaToDAy 66(1) nations in Africa? Are we losing out to the Chinese?" "Why should the U.S. continue the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides massive support to corrupt African regimes?" Some lauded these questions as appropriate, given that US aid to Africa is susceptible to corruption and waste (Mariam 2017) , but others, such as McCormick (2017) , pointed to the confrontationality and dismissiveness of the questions as reflecting the administration's real intentions toward Africa.
In terms of policy, the Trump administration has shown "almost zero interest in Africa" (Kim Elliot, quoted in Wroughton 2017) until recently. A four-country, security-focused visit by Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, to Africa early in 2018 was seen by some as an attempt to mend relations, though the disrespect with which Trump treats the continent was evidenced by his firing of Tillerson during his visit (Kazeem and Dahir 2018) . However, on December 13, 2018, John Bolton, then National Security Advisor, announced the administration's new Africa policy in a speech at the Heritage Foundation. He laid out a framework for US-Africa relations that would be based on narrow bilateral relationships, trade and investment, security, and the efficient use of American aid. More of a general philosophy than a specific pronouncement, this policy was originally slated for public release, but has since been classified (Gass 2019 Bolton characterized Chinese engagement with the continent as predatory and claimed, "China is now poised to take over Zambia's national power and utility company in order to collect on Zambia's financial obligations" (this was later disputed by the Zambian Office of the Presidency). Analyzing these developments alongside changes to US aid and investment agencies, we can now begin to piece together the administration's view of the USAfrica relationship.
Us-africa Trade Relations
One of the main channels through which the Trump administration could directly affect development outcomes in African countries is through trade relations. African economies remain highly dependent on primary resource extraction and exports (Bond 2006) , though most countries on the continent africaToDAy 66 (1) remain commodity importers, given the dependence of many on oil and gas imports. With fragmented intracontinental markets, high transaction costs, and lack of regional integration, Africa is far more dependent on overseas trade than are other continents. Intra-African trade accounts for roughly 20 percent of the continent's total foreign trade (Kohnert 2018) . A decade of Africa Rising narratives in popular media has obscured the fact that structural transformation, as expressed through deepening diversification, higher value-added exports, and the creation of high labor-productivity sectors, has not happened on most of the continent: instead, the true engines of economic growth have been a combination of high commodity prices, debt relief, and a glut of primary-sector foreign investment (Taylor 2016) .
Since the turn of the millennium, US-Africa trade has largely been expressed under AGOA, which was well received in both houses of Congress: its 2015 renewal was sponsored by a nearly equal number of Republicans and Democrats and passed nearly unanimously in the Senate, and it does not expire until 2025. Built on previous US trade policies, it was designed to stimulate manufacturing growth by providing certain African countries with tariff-free access to US markets. Today, it provides duty-free access to the United States for approximately 6,800 product lines from forty countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not a negotiated agreement between parties, but it involves concessions offered to African countries by the United States, to which access is negotiated bilaterally. For instance, South Africa, to continue benefitting from AGOA, had to accommodate US interests and establish a quota agreement with regard to its poultry exports (CNBC Africa 2018).
As per the AGOA guidelines, eligibility requirements are reviewed annually, and beneficiary status can be granted or rescinded at the US president's discretion. Beneficiary countries have no recourse for dispute settlement-which differentiates AGOA's nonreciprocal preferences from those of other widely used agreements, such as the WTO General System of Preferences. Given this, AGOA status can be used as leverage by the Trump Administration.
AGOA, while it has largely failed to create broad-based growth throughout the continent due to sparse usage, has become a useful tool for attracting manufacturing sector investment in countries such as Ethiopia and South Africa (interview with Dr. Cobus van Staden, Johannesburg, March 2018). Since its implementation in 2000, AGOA has stimulated Africa-US trade valued at approximately US$36 billion annually, has become the main channel of US-African trade, with more than 70 percent of US imports from AGOA-eligible countries occurring through the program (Bonarriva 2014) , and has helped create more than 300,000 jobs in Africa (Owusu and Otiso 2018) . AGOA benefits the US and has been used to promote globalizing norms, such as liberal markets and democratic reforms in Africa, as well as to open up markets for US goods and services. Indeed, according to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to be eligible for AGOA, countries must establish a market-based economy, "eliminate barriers to U.S. trade and investment," and address a host of other conditionalities (USTR 2018a).
Oil, for most of its existence, has been the main product entering the United States duty free under AGOA, thereby replicating the colonial structure of trade relations; however, the US trade deficit with the forty AGOA countries fell from $64 billion in 2008 to only $7.9 billion in 2017, largely as a result of increased shale-oil production domestically (Raji 2018) . For many non-oil-exporting countries, textiles and apparel have been the main exports, with other sectors experiencing only a lackluster response (International Trade Administration 2016). Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Madagascar have established themselves as the leading exporters of textiles and apparel under the act, accounting for nearly 90 percent of AGOA apparel exports in 2017.
AGOA, though it supports approximately 120,000 export-related jobs within the United States (Reboredo 2017) , has been criticized as supporting foreign entrepreneurs and firms, mostly of Chinese origin, who use it as a back door to get their goods to the United States (Reboredo 2017; Rotunno, Vézina, and Wang 2013) . This argument ignores the fact that while the firms may be foreign, the employees are overwhelmingly locals from the countries where production is based, and African states may aim to use this investment to precipitate skills and technology transfers and develop local industries. Despite Trump's protectionist tendencies and his promises to renegotiate US trade agreements in the spirit of America First, he has not yet spoken publicly about AGOA. Thus far, he has shown no interest in challenging AGOA, probably because it enjoys bipartisan congressional support, and he is focused on trade relations with China. In fact, a recent statement released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative notes that the administration is seeking to "build on AGOA's success by strengthening bilateral trade relationships in sub-Saharan Africa with the goal of establishing a free trade agreement that could serve as a model for developing countries" (USTR 2018b).
3 However, despite this discursive continuity, the Trump administration recently suspended duty-free treatment of clothing imports from Rwanda when the country raised duties on imported (used) apparel and footwear to stimulate domestic production. The restriction on secondhand clothing was meant to be a coordinated effort by the members of the East African community, but Tanzania and others backed down in the face of US trade threats-a kind of free market mercantilism, where the United States uses its market power to extract trade concessions. Exports of secondhand clothes do generate thousands of jobs in the United States, but those to Rwanda account for only 0.003 percent of total US exports-around US$47 million a year (CGTN 2018). However, Rwanda exports only US$43 million a year under AGOA (BBC 2018), and replacement markets have now been found in China.
Trump has a strong preference for bilateral trade deals over multiparty agreements (Gaffey 2017) , as was highlighted at the 2017 US-Africa Business Summit in Washington, DC, where US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross proclaimed that US-Africa relations would transition from being aid-based to trade-based, with "two-way trade agreements being preferred to large africaToDAy 66(1) multilateral agreements" (Saldinger 2017). 4 Thus, any hopes for revising AGOA to make it more conducive for African industrialization, such as helping build human and industrial capacity to produce goods for the United States seems to have to been shelved for now.
Africa's global trading networks may become a casualty of Trump's protectionist policies and trade wars with China and elsewhere.
5 South Africa is on the list of countries that must pay sizable new duties on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) exports to the United States (Wasserman 2018) . The administration's proposed tariffs on European vehicle imports (20%) could further hurt the country, as it exports approximately US$4 billion of automotive components to EU manufacturers (Martin 2018) . Metalworking and manufacturing are vital to South Africa, with metalworking employing 21 percent of South Africa's manufacturing workforce (Kohnert 2018; Statistics South Africa 2014) . On the macro level, a continuation of the US trade war with China could spur a decline in the demand for commodities, the main driver of many African economies. The administration's tariffs have provoked a targeted response from the Chinese government, including a duty on American soybeans, which account for 41 percent of Chinese imports (Swanson 2018)-an area from which Ghana and other producers on the continent could benefit.
Development aid
Trump's foreign policy can be described as promilitary and anti-aid (Lynch and De Luce 2017) . Effects on Africa can manifest themselves indirectly through reduced support for international development organizations and/ or directly through US programs on the continent.
Official development assistance from the United States is substantially lower than the recommended 0.7 percent of GNP (OECD 2018). It contributes approximately US$8 billion worth of aid to Africa yearly (Reboredo 2017 ). Trump's reduction of US funding to the United Nations and affiliated agencies, by nearly $300 million a year (Helmore 2017) , will drastically decrease that organization's ability to fight hunger, disease, and war in Africa and elsewhere. Additionally, in a move reminiscent of the Bush era, the State Department has threatened to defund several organizations that specialize in family-planning services and reproductive health, under the claim that these operations violate a newly instituted antiabortion policy. To supplement these changes, the administration wanted to reinstate the so-called global gag rule, which "prevents any organization from providing abortion services, information, counseling, or referrals from receiving U.S. federal funding" (Sow 2017). Among these, the United Nations Population Fund provides child and maternal health services in 150 countries; however, the U.S Senate disagreed with the administration and voted against this (Mellen 2017) .
Some observers fear that the Trump administration will cripple the capacity of the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to deliver development assistance by failing to fill africaToDAy 66(1) important positions in these agencies and through budget cuts (Aleem 2018 (McCormick 2017) . In addition to the cuts, the administration has failed to nominate replacements for hundreds of positions within the State Department-and prominent African countries, such as South Africa, Tanzania, and Sudan, so far lack ambassadorial appointments.
Another source of trepidation in the international development community is that the Trump administration may be less supportive of existing US development programs in Africa, even when it is impossible to abandon them in the short term. In other words, signature programs of previous administrations, such as MCA, AGOA, PEPFAR, and Obama's Power Africa, may be facing malign neglect. For instance, though Trump has indicated his support for PEPFAR, his proposed cuts in State Department and USAID funding could affect programs that support the provision of critical services, poverty alleviation, health, education, emergency responses to disasters such as Ebola, and so forth (Beaumont 2018 ). Trump's proposal to eliminate the USADF, which promotes development by investing in African enterprises, means that many development programs run by African partners would come to a halt overnight (Okeowo 2017a) . Such lack of overt support could have a significant impact on African countries, given that US development aid to Africa, through programs such as AGOA and MCA, have become the main instruments for spreading ideas of economic liberalization, governance or democracy, and human rights, though this may also open up policy space.
The administration's new Africa strategy hints at a more strategic use of aid, which will be directed away from countries that do not align with Washington's agenda. As Bolton noted: "countries that repeatedly vote against the United States in international forums, or take action counter to U.S. interests, should not receive generous American foreign aid" (White House 2018b). Moreover, USAID has responded to recent criticisms from within and without through a shift toward what it terms enterprise driven development, 6 which will focus on market-based approaches as a way to foster African selfsufficiency, as well as improve the efficiency of aid practices, representing a shift away from traditional government-to-government aid.
Us FDI to africa
Africa been experiencing increased FDI inflow in recent years, but the pattern has been uneven, reflecting global uncertainty. According to Ernst and Young (2017) , 2016 was the worst year for economic growth across africaToDAy 66(1) sub-Saharan Africa in more than twenty years. The total number of FDI projects in Africa was down 12.3 percent, and FDI-related jobs declined by 13.1 percent, compared to 2015. However, capital investment into Africa rose 31.9 percent in 2016, and the continent's share of global FDI capital flows increased to 11.4 percent, up from 9.4 percent in 2015.
Among the largest changes to US-African foreign policy in recent years is the passing of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development act, and its subsequent creation of the US International Development Finance Corporation, which will have a spending cap of approximately $60 billion to invest in emerging markets worldwide. This institution will have a twenty-year authorization period and will absorb OPIC (the previous US development-finance corporation) and take on the role of USAID's Development Credit Authority. It will be able to make equity investments, provide technical assistance, increase the availability of capital for investors by providing small grants and first-loss guarantees, and allow investors from other countries to use program mechanisms, so as to enlarge the US investment portfolio and soft power footprint (Runde and Bandura 2018) .
In recent years, US investors have generally been more hesitant about investing in Africa than those from other regions, including Asia (Ernst and Young 2017) . Nonetheless, the United States, remain the leading investor in Africa according to the number of projects; accounting for approximately 13.5 percent of total FDI projects in 2016. The main targets for investment by US companies have included South Africa and northern Africa, particularly Morocco and Egypt (Gaffey 2017) . However, the rate of investment from the United States has fallen recently, and in 2016, the total number of US projects in the continent declined by 5.6 percent, as "speculation that President Donald Trump's foreign policy may be more insular than his immediate predecessor, is creating some uncertainty regarding the future of the US' engagement with Africa" (Ernst and Young 2017, 19) .
Sources of FDI into Africa are now more diversified, making the continent more resilient to the effects of external forces. For instance, investment from the Asia-Pacific region into Africa hit an all-time high in 2016 (Ernst and Young 2017, 18) . This is notable, as 2016 saw a decline in investment from traditional partners like the United States and the United Kingdom. Asian countries accounted for more than a fifth of projects and more than half of capital investment, and companies from the region were the largest contributors to FDI jobs to Africa. It is therefore no surprise that in contrast to the decreased US FDI to Africa in 2016, the number of Chinese-funded projects increased by more than 100 percent and created more than 38,000 jobs-more than three times as many as American investments (Gaffey 2017) . US officials, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have roundly criticized Chinese investment in Africa, with Tillerson stating that Chinese funding "encourages dependency" and "when coupled with the political and fiscal pressure, endangers Africa's natural resources and its long-term economic and political stability" (Africa News 2018). Despite these warnings, africaToDAy 66(1) the administration's America First rhetoric and its turn toward economic nationalism may make efforts to improve US economic ties with Africa more difficult and have detrimental effects on US foreign private investment to Africa by undermining confidence.
security or Terrorism
US engagement with Africa for addressing its security and terrorism challenges has a long history but was intensified after the coordinated terrorist incidents in the US on September 11, 2001 (Owusu 2007) . US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2007 under President George W. Bush to serve as a unified command, responsible for engaging with African nations. The purpose was to develop long-term cooperative relationships and contingencies for managing international crises of mutual concern to the United States and African nations. 7 In addition, the US military established an official base and dozens of small facilities and staging areas that collectively host thousands of US troops (Allen 2018) . President Bush described AFRICOM as an effort to bring peace and security to Africa and promote the goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa (Dolanmay 2017) . To him, it was "a humanitarian mission, . . . and we want to get it right" (quoted in Geldof 2008). However, humanitarianism and war are often mutually imbricated (Barnett 2011) , with critics arguing that the United States has used AFRICOM as a front to run expansive and undocumented operations, including highly militarized operations in Somalia against Al-Shabab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate (Dolanmay 2017) . Nevertheless, the merger of humanitarianism and war as AFRICOM's primary motivation faltered after the NATO bombardment of Libya in 2011, which President Obama later said was his biggest foreign policy regret. President Trump's pronouncements during the campaign and since coming to power indicate that security and terrorism are among his primary concerns. The highly militarized US presence in Africa, characterized by US bases and camps across the continent, may be intensified (Turse 2015) . In a speech following a NATO summit, Trump proclaimed: "Africa right now has got problems that few people will even understand. . . . If you saw some of the things that I see through intelligence [of] what is going on in Africa, it is so sad, it is so vicious and violent, and we want peace, we want peace for Africa" (quoted in Adebayo 2018). Many Americans were surprised to learn, after some of their soldiers had been killed there, that American troops were in Niger in 2018. The opening of China's first international military base in Djibouti only a few miles from US Camp Lemonnier is evidence of competition in Africa.
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The Trump administration's highly contentious and contested travel ban includes three African countries and was panned by the African Union (Vanguard 2017), but the presence of terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and others, in parts of the continent could provide opportunities for closer cooperation with African governments.
9 Islamist terror groups killed more africaToDAy 66 (1) than 10,000 people in Africa in 2017, and the risk of terrorism in the United States may grow if these groups consolidate their holdings (Rosenthal 2018) . The America First policy is in evidence when that country's interests are felt to be directly threatened, so the pace of drone, air, and other strikes in Somalia against Al-Shabbab increased in 2017 to more than thirty-five (Okeowo 2017b; Serle and Purkiss, n.d.) . From 2001 to 2016, the maximum number of reported US strikes in that country was less than fifty (Drones Team n.d.). Such an increase may generate resistance and attract recruits to groups like Al-Shabbab. Meanwhile, the number of special operation forces on the continent who could more accurately target terrorists is being reduced (Williams 2019) . Despite numerous terror threats on the continent, the Trump administration has been highly critical of UN peacekeeping missions, preferring unilateralism. UN peacekeeping supports 110,000 personnel (consisting of everything from troops to engineers and doctors) operating in fourteen separate missions, seven of which are based in Africa (Western Sahara, Abyei, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, and Mali). The United States currently provides approximately 28 percent of total funding ($2.2 billion) for UN peacekeeping missions, though Nikki Haley, the former US ambassador to the UN, stated "there are places we can cut. . . . Everybody knows there's fat at the UN. Everybody knows there's fat in the peacekeeping missions" (Koran 2018 ). Since then, largely due to pressure from the administration, the UN cut nearly $600 million from its annual peacekeeping budget (Besheer 2017 ), yet despite the criticism, a newly released report by the US Government Accountability Office found that UN peacekeepers provide excellent value for the services they provide, noting that the UN's $2.4 billion operation in the CAR would have cost $5.7 billion if undertaken by the US unilaterally. Additionally, the UN force exhibits greater international acceptance and legitimacy (GAO 2018) .
The United States has roughly 6,000 troops stationed in Africa (Rosenthal 2018) , and increasing militarization and securitization throughout the continent, combined with Trump's crude rhetoric and gaffes, could significantly harm US soft or smart power (Nye 2009 ), especially as African countries increasingly rely on states in Asia for trade and aid. A recent survey conducted throughout the continent by Afrobarometer (2016) shows that while the United States is still thought of as the best model for national development, China is close behind-30 percent to 26 percent, respectively. Additionally, Trump's statements of support for authoritarian leaders such as Egypt's General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Russia's Vladimir Putin (Nordland 2017) and his decision to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council (Harris 2018 ) could harm US norm-forming abilities, as the traditional Western narrative about the US and China's role in Africa has been a choice between US-led development via human rights versus Chinese-style authoritarianism (Mawdsley 2008 
Climate Change
Another area where Trump's views on global cooperation could affect Africa is climate change. African countries contribute only 3.8 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, but they experience the worst of global warming. Temperatures are predicted to increase 2°C by the last two decades of this century-a scenario that would put more than half the continent's population at risk of undernourishment (United Nations 2015). In the near future, effects could include water shortages and stresses for 90 to 220 million people by 2020, increased rates of infectious tropical diseases, crop failures and food security issues, and more frequent extreme weather events (Golubski 2017) . Seven out of the world's ten countries considered the most threatened by climate change are in Africa (Bishop 2017), and extreme weather events are already taking a great toll on some rapidly growing African cities, threatening the livelihoods of millions (Dahir 2017) .
During his campaign, Trump called global warming a hoax, and he said he would pull the United States out of the UN-sponsored Paris Climate Change Agreement when he could, in 2020. The agreement was signed by 195 countries, including all fifty-five African ones. Trump has promised to "stop all payments of US tax dollars to UN global warming programs" (Yack 2017) . Under the Paris accords, developed countries like the US are to contribute to a $100 billion annual fund for developing countries by 2020. Experts have advised African countries to develop clean energy systems, specifically wind and solar power, and vigorously to implement the Sustainable Development Goals (Munang and Mgendi 2017) . To achieve this objective, African countries will need capital and expertise from developed countries, including the United States. Thus, the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the agreement will have significant negative effects on African states.
Concerns over climate change and security will likely be intertwined throughout the continent as rising temperatures contribute to an increase in conflict (Kuo 2016) . The US military considers climate change a major security risk for this century (Johnson 2014) , and experts have pointed out that a nexus of issues-food and water scarcity, ethnic and religious tensions, and migration-are at the center of the current crisis around the terrorist movement Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, as Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 percent, compromising many livelihoods in the region, as well as contributing to increased piracy off the Horn of Africa (Bhatiya 2017 ).
China and the United Kingdom: US Competitors in Africa
President Trump's attempt to change the rules of the game for globalization through his foreign policy are leading to selective US disengagement with Africa, combined with a disciplinary governmental and military gaze; however, this will have indirect effects. US competitors in Africa, especially China, are looking for ways to strengthen their relationships africaToDAy 66 (1) with governments there. Indeed, China replaced the United States as Africa's largest trading partner in 2009 and has hosted regular meetings between African ministers and their Chinese counterparts since 2000, including the triennial Forum on Africa-China Cooperation. Under the guise of South-South Cooperation, a concept whose rhetoric mirrors that of globalization (a win-win process, which will reorder global relations and create more equitable growth), Chinese investments in African countries have increased drastically, and many Africans are enjoying the benefits of Chinese-built roads, railways, airports, and so forth (Brigety 2017) . Working under the umbrella project One Belt, One Road, now renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (which builds on previous geoeconomic endeavors, such as Go Out and Go West), a wide variety of Chinese enterprises, both state and privately owned, are undertaking projects in Africa. While largely an economic endeavor, aimed at reducing the effects of overaccumulation 10 back home, the Belt and Road Initiative is an exercise in power projection. Projects under its umbrella generally serve as catalysts for improved politico-economic relationships and characterize China's flexible approach (in terms of funding modalities) to achieving its goals (Carmody and Taylor 2010) . Indeed, a report by Ernst & Young (Lalor et al. 2017) indicated that since 2005, China has invested approximately $65 billion in 293 FDI projects, creating 130,750 jobs on the continent, though some of these will have displaced domestic firms' production, so the net figure will be lower.
Whether the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese investments as a whole can be used to change fundamentally Africa's place within the global division of labor or induce large-scale industrialization partly depends on African governments themselves (Ziso 2018) . Frequently unstable economic and security environments, combined with massive infrastructural deficits, can deter investment, while corruption, capital extraction, and white-elephant projects can squander gains quickly, though counterexamples exist, such as Ethiopia, which has been successfully industrializing in recent years (Oqubay 2015) . Additionally, some have criticized China's initiatives as being one-way streets, exporting the country's project and banking models without reciprocal openings of its capital or consumer markets. As Kenderdine (2017) 
notes:
China's trade and investment strategy abroad is the practical industrial policy matrix through which its local industries, local governments [,] and policy banks are to intersect with partner economies as part of the wider belt and road trade strategy. However, this combination of policy bank loans and industrial overcapacity export is effectively China offshoring its local debt problem to unwitting trading partners.
Equitable growth will largely depend on local policies and the creation of productive networks and assemblages. In addition to China, other countries will be happy to fill any void that will allow them access to Africa's markets and resources (Carmody 2016 ). Britain's hope to boost trade with Africa by building a so-called Empire 2.0 is an example of such efforts. This ambitious, though poorly articulated, agenda for a series of new trade agreements with Commonwealth countries was a major talking point among leave campaigners, who framed the European Union's Economic Partnership Agreements as being harmful to the UK's interests because of their supposed cumbersomeness and parochialism (Murray-Evans 2016) . These agreements were said to constrain the UK's ability to create liberal trade agreements. While the exact shape of Brexit remains unclear, a shift toward an aid or development policy based largely on national interest and the search for investment opportunities is openly mooted (Langan 2016; Price 2016 ). This narrative downplays Britain's relative economic decline throughout the latter 20th century and the agency of both African and Commonwealth states, yet as Murray-Evans (2016) notes, it was widespread resistance from African states, rather than intra-EU disagreements or protectionism, that led to difficulties with the current EU trade liberalization agenda under the Cotonou Agreement.
As currently constructed, EU trade agreements with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries essentially collectivize responsibilities for the continents' former colonies through instruments such as the European Development Fund. Brexit will require a fundamental reformulation of the UK's trade relations with Commonwealth states (Price 2016) . Patrick Gomes, Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, maintains that any new trade deal would require "a transition period of at least six years," as any fewer would introduce market uncertainty in an abrupt and destabilizing manner. He derides the Empire 2.0 trade strategy: "This is in our view reactionary, trying to recreate what we've gone beyond" (quoted in Neslen 2017) .
Several UK members of Parliament have spoken at length about the need to create a prodevelopment trade policy, one that dismantles nontariff barriers and eases protective subsidies for UK farmers, though these ideas remain at odds with the current stated plans of the UK's Conservative Party (Langan 2016 ). Replicating the current EU model would reproduce its extant problems, while seeking more ambitious liberalization agreements would be difficult, given preexisting African apprehensions and the UK's small market size. For Africa, Brexit could further complicate a delicate economic situation, characterized by reduced commodity prices and higher external borrowing costs (Sow and Sy 2016) . States that rely on the UK may be hit hard; scholars from North-West University have presented evidence that Brexit could cause South Africa's GDP growth to fall by 0.1 percent; however, Brexit could create opportunities for more favorable agreements for the continent, reflecting the need for renegotiating existing arrangements (ICTSD 2016 
Conclusion
Africa, as a whole, has arguably suffered from globalization (Bond 2006) , but as we have demonstrated, the implication of US-led renegotiated globalization for Africa could be even more negative. A trade war between the United States and China, as well as with the EU and other countries, if it escalates, could reduce global growth, depressing commodity prices and negatively affecting many African countries.
Part of the Trump administration's approach toward Africa can be characterized as one of selective delinking, itself composed of a three-track strategy: of disengagement by design, through cutbacks in aid for instance; of disengagement by neglect, by not committing to an early renewal or extension of AGOA; and of disciplinary governmentality via leveraging aid, market access, and military axes. The approach can be considered coercive governmentality, evidenced by the shift from multilateral and regional agreements to transactional, bilateral engagement. The United States will continue to practice conditional support and insist on reciprocity, but will likely be more hostile toward countries it characterizes as opposing its interests. Additionally, with the new Africa strategy, aid will likely join trade as a strategic tool.
Other dimensions of the Trump administration's America First policy that could affect Africa are not discussed here. For instance, the global crackdown on immigration could significantly affect African countries' reliance on remittances as tools for economic development and poverty alleviation (World Bank 2017a). Similarly, the effects of possibly weakening the European Union on Africa's own experiment with regional integration are yet to be seen, with some already calling for disbanding the African Union (Ayittey 2016) .
Geopolitical competition opens up policy space for African elites, but some have argued that with the BRI, China is losing interest in the continent in favor of the more economically important Europe and the Middle East (ChinaAfrica Project 2017). A critical question is whether Africa can take advantage of the emerging economic and geopolitical environments and turn them to its advantage, 11 but as shown here, this may be difficult. Of the Four P's (Bruce Jentleson, cited in Kalu 2014), meant to inform US policy toward Africa, power is currently trumping peace, prosperity, and principles. 4. This has since been entrenched via the new africa strategy.
5. The initial months of Trump's presidency seemed to show a shift from an emphasis on geoeconomics to geopolitics in relations with China, with Trump saying he would not label China a currency manipulator because it was being cooperative over North Korea; however, as Chinese trade with North Korea expanded, Trump's rhetoric shifted back to something closer to that expressed in his preelection book, which called China an enemy (Trump 2017) . Of course, having a polyphonic discourse may be an aspect of the art of the deal (Trump and schwartz 2016) , by which one unnerves one's opponent, and Trump had previously said he wanted to be unpredictable with China.
6. It is important to note that the agency's shift toward the private sector began under the previous administration.
7. according to the aFRICOm website (https://www.africom.mil/), it "disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, protects U.s. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflict, and builds african partner defense capability and capacity in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity. "
8. lemonnier and Djibouti are strategically located on the bab el-mandeb strait, a gateway to egypt's suez Canal, one of the world's busiest shipping corridors. They are close to areas of significant Us engagement, including somalia, and a short distance from the arabian Peninsula, including yemen (woody 2017).
9. Trump's first phone calls to african leaders were to President muhammadu buhari of Nigeria and Jacob Zuma of south africa. It is reported that security was one of the main topics discussed, with Trump pledging his support for the sale of Us aircraft to support Nigeria's fight against boko Haram (white House press release, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the -press-office/2017/02/15/readout-presidents-call-president-muhammadu-buhari-nigeria).
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